The 2027 Oyo State governorship election is already shaping up as one of the most closely watched political contests in the South-West, with media entrepreneur and broadcaster Oriyomi Hamzat of the Accord Party seeking to challenge the established political order. His emergence has generated considerable interest, particularly following the victory of Osun State Governor Ademola Adeleke on the Accord platform in the 2026 Osun governorship election.
Adeleke’s victory has provided a striking political precedent. Having governed Osun under the Peoples Democratic Party before defecting to Accord, Adeleke successfully secured re-election on the platform of a party that, until recently, had been regarded largely as a “minor” political force. He polled 511,067 votes against the 444,815 votes recorded by the All Progressives Congress candidate, winning 19 of Osun State’s 30 local government areas. His victory demonstrated that, under the right circumstances, personal popularity, grassroots mobilisation, political structures and voter dissatisfaction can combine to overcome the conventional advantage enjoyed by Nigeria’s major political parties.
The question now is whether Oriyomi Hamzat can reproduce a similar political upset in Oyo State. The comparison, however, must be approached carefully. While both men are associated with Accord and possess significant grassroots appeal, their political circumstances are markedly different. Adeleke entered the 2026 Osun election as an incumbent governor with an established political structure, government visibility and a record of four years in office. Hamzat, by contrast, is an outsider seeking to build a statewide electoral machine largely around his personal popularity, media influence and the support of the Accord Party.
The task is therefore not simply for Hamzat to become popular. He must convert popularity into votes, votes into polling-unit victories, and polling-unit victories into a statewide electoral coalition capable of overcoming the structures of the established parties.
Oyo presents an especially difficult environment. Governor Seyi Makinde’s political influence remains substantial after two terms in office, while the APC retains a sizeable statewide structure and the backing of the ruling party at the federal level. Hamzat must also navigate the politics of zoning, regional identity and the longstanding perception that political power in Oyo has disproportionately favoured the Ibadan axis.
Nevertheless, Hamzat possesses assets that cannot easily be dismissed. His years as a broadcaster have given him an unusual level of direct contact with ordinary residents, particularly through his widely followed radio programmes. His humanitarian activities have further strengthened his public image as someone associated with the concerns of ordinary citizens. His “Oyo Npe O” movement also provides an embryonic political structure that could potentially be transformed into a statewide campaign network.
The central question, therefore, is not whether Hamzat has popularity. It is whether that popularity can be organised, funded and translated into a winning electoral coalition across all 33 local government areas of Oyo State.
Yes, Oriyomi Hamzat is a prominent Ibadan journalist who transitioned from broadcasting and journalism into media entrepreneurship and philanthropy. Having built his career across various media platforms, including print and radio, he eventually founded Agidigbo 88.7 FM, which became an important platform for his direct engagement with members of the public.
One of the programmes that significantly shaped his public identity was his nightly call-in programme, “Kokoro Alate”. The programme provided an avenue for ordinary citizens to discuss grievances, social problems and perceived injustices. Through years of listening to callers and intervening in community-related issues, Hamzat developed a reputation for giving visibility to people who often felt excluded from formal political conversations.
This distinction is important to his political ambition. Unlike many politicians whose contact with voters intensifies only during election periods, Hamzat’s relationship with a significant section of his audience has been built over several years through daily media engagement. His supporters therefore argue that his grassroots popularity is not merely an election-time phenomenon.
His philanthropic activities have also contributed to his public image. Through his humanitarian initiatives and charity work, including support for vulnerable children, Hamzat has cultivated an identity that extends beyond journalism and broadcasting. His political message consequently revolves around empathy, accessibility and responsiveness.
He presents himself as a representative of the ordinary citizen, promising to improve living conditions, create opportunities for young people and women, and make government more responsive to the needs of citizens. His political language is heavily centred on listening, service and giving voice to people who believe that the political establishment has ignored them.
Hamzat’s political relationship with Governor Seyi Makinde also adds another dimension to his candidacy. The two were once considered political allies, with Hamzat having publicly claimed a role in Makinde’s political emergence. However, their relationship subsequently deteriorated, eventually placing Hamzat on a different political path from the governor.
That history could become both an advantage and a liability. On one hand, Hamzat can present himself as someone who understands the political establishment from within and has now chosen to challenge it. On the other hand, opponents may attempt to portray his candidacy as a personal political disagreement rather than a broader movement for change.
His declaration of interest, which reportedly attracted thousands of supporters from across Oyo State, nevertheless demonstrated the mobilisation potential around his personality. For Accord, this personal following is arguably its greatest asset in the state.
Accord remains a relatively small political party when compared with the APC and PDP. Its national structure and historical electoral footprint cannot presently be placed in the same category as Nigeria’s two dominant political parties.
The situation changed considerably after Ademola Adeleke’s movement to Accord and his subsequent victory in Osun. The Osun result gave the party a level of political visibility that it had previously lacked and strengthened the argument that Accord could serve as a credible alternative platform in the South-West.
In Oyo, however, the party still faces the difficult task of transforming visibility into a functioning electoral organisation. Hamzat’s decision to merge his “Oyo Npe O” support network with Accord gave the party access to a pre-existing political movement. That development is significant because it means the party is not entirely starting from zero. Hamzat already has supporters, community contacts and media visibility that can potentially be converted into ward-level structures.
However, popularity and party structure are not the same thing. A successful governorship election requires thousands of people working across polling units, wards and local governments. These include polling agents, coordinators, canvassers, volunteers, women and youth organisers, legal teams, collation observers and logistics personnel. Established parties such as the APC and PDP have spent years developing these structures.
Accord must therefore build much of its operational capacity around Hamzat’s personal network. The party’s internal disagreements also represent a challenge. The emergence of a rival faction and the legal dispute surrounding the governorship ticket could potentially consume valuable political energy. In a closely fought election, prolonged internal disputes can damage public confidence, weaken mobilisation and create uncertainty among supporters.
For Hamzat, resolving such disagreements and projecting a united party structure will be essential. A candidate cannot credibly campaign as an alternative to the established political order while appearing unable to control the organisation through which he intends to contest.
Ultimately, Accord’s greatest strength in Oyo is likely to remain Hamzat himself. Its greatest weakness is that the party has yet to demonstrate that it possesses an independent statewide electoral machine comparable to those of the APC and PDP/APM.
Hamzat’s governorship ambition emerged publicly in early 2026, when he declared his intention to contest the Oyo State governorship election. His entry immediately attracted attention because of his established media profile and the size of his grassroots following.
The months that followed were dominated by efforts to secure the Accord ticket and consolidate his political movement. Accord subsequently affirmed Hamzat as its candidate amid internal disagreements, while rival claims to the ticket generated legal and political controversy.
Meanwhile, Governor Seyi Makinde moved to shape the succession battle by backing Barrister Bimbo Adekanmbi on the Peoples Democratic Party/ Allied Peoples Movement platform. The governor presented Adekanmbi as the candidate who would continue the administration’s development agenda, popularly associated with the “Omituntun” brand.
The APC also moved to establish its own campaign structure around Senator Sharafadeen Alli, ensuring that the 2027 contest would not simply be a two-way battle between Hamzat and the Makinde-backed candidate.
The August 2026 Osun governorship election then introduced a new variable into Oyo’s political calculations. Adeleke’s victory on the Accord platform demonstrated that the party could win a major South-West governorship election under the right political circumstances. That result inevitably strengthened the argument of those who believe Hamzat could also achieve an upset in Oyo.
Ademola Adeleke’s 2026 victory is perhaps the most important reference point for analysing Hamzat’s prospects. The Osun election demonstrated that the traditional dominance of the APC and PDP could be disrupted by an alternative party when a popular candidate possesses sufficient political capital.
Adeleke won 511,067 votes against 444,815 for the APC candidate, winning 19 of the state’s 30 local government areas. His performance showed that the Accord platform could carry a statewide election when supported by a strong candidate and an effective electoral coalition.
However, there is an important distinction that cannot be ignored: Adeleke was an incumbent. He had already governed Osun for four years. His government had visibility across the state, and voters had an opportunity to assess his performance before deciding whether to retain him. He also entered the election with an established political network developed during his previous PDP campaigns.
Hamzat does not possess that advantage. He cannot campaign on a record of running the Oyo State Government. He cannot rely on the institutional visibility that accompanies incumbency. Nor can he simply inherit the structures of an outgoing administration. His challenge is therefore considerably more difficult.
What Hamzat can learn from Adeleke, however, is the importance of converting personal popularity into a broader political movement. Adeleke’s victory was not based on the Accord name alone. It was built around his personal identity, existing political relationships, mobilisation capacity and ability to attract support beyond the traditional boundaries of his party.
The same principle could apply to Hamzat. His radio audience gives him a pre-existing communication network. His philanthropic activities give him a humanitarian identity. His “Oyo Npe O” movement provides a mobilisation platform. Accord provides the ballot-paper identity. The missing component is a disciplined statewide organisation capable of converting these assets into votes.
Even more, Oyo State presents a substantially different political environment from Osun. The PDP dominated the 2023 governorship election, with Governor Seyi Makinde securing 563,617 votes against 251,230 for the APC candidate. That result demonstrated the strength of Makinde’s personal political organisation and the depth of the PDP’s support across the state.
After completing his second term, Makinde’s influence over the 2027 succession contest remains significant. His decision to support Adekanmbi under the APM gives the latter access to a political network that has governed the state for eight years. The Makinde-backed campaign is likely to focus heavily on continuity. The argument will be that voters should preserve the gains of the existing administration rather than entrust the state to an unfamiliar political alternative.
The APC, meanwhile, enters the race with a different proposition. As the ruling party at the federal level, it possesses national political influence, substantial organisational capacity and a network of experienced politicians. Senator Sharafadeen Alli’s candidacy gives the party a prominent figure around whom it can build its campaign.
The APC’s argument will likely centre on change, national alignment and the need to provide an alternative to the administration that has governed Oyo since 2019. Between these two established political forces sits Hamzat. His biggest opportunity may be the possibility that neither the Makinde camp nor the APC can consolidate the entire anti-establishment or protest vote.
Zoning adds another layer to the contest. Oyo’s political history contains longstanding regional sensitivities involving Ibadan, Oke-Ogun, Oyo/Ogbomoso and Ibarapa. There has been growing advocacy for a more balanced distribution of political power, particularly from communities that believe the governorship has historically been dominated by Ibadan interests.
Hamzat’s Ibadan identity could therefore become a significant factor. If voters in Oke-Ogun or other regions perceive the election as another contest between Ibadan-based political interests, Hamzat may struggle to secure the breadth of support necessary for victory. Conversely, if he successfully convinces voters outside Ibadan that his campaign is not simply an Ibadan project, zoning concerns could become an opportunity rather than a liability. His campaign will therefore need to demonstrate a genuinely statewide character.
Again, If Hamzat is serious about reproducing Adeleke’s feat, grassroots organisation may ultimately matter more than the size of his rallies. Large crowds are politically useful because they demonstrate enthusiasm and generate media attention. They do not, however, automatically translate into votes. The real test will take place at polling units.
Accord will need reliable agents across Oyo State who understand the voting process, monitor accreditation and voting, protect the integrity of results and remain present through the collation process. Beyond polling agents, the party will need ward coordinators, local government coordinators, youth organisers, women leaders and community influencers. This is where the difference between Hamzat and the established parties becomes most obvious.
The APC and PDP have spent years developing political structures at the ward and local-government levels. Hamzat must convert his relatively informal support network into something more systematic. His media background nevertheless provides a unique advantage. His radio audience could serve as the starting point for a volunteer-based mobilisation structure. Listeners who have interacted with his programmes for years can potentially become campaign volunteers, canvassers and community organisers.
Young voters will also be critical. Oyo has a substantial youth population, and Hamzat’s media profile may give him an advantage among voters who are more comfortable with social media, radio and alternative political messaging than traditional party structures. Women are equally important. Hamzat’s emphasis on opportunities for women and vulnerable groups could become a central part of his mobilisation strategy. The challenge is to transform these broad constituencies into an organised electoral network.
Also, Hamzat’s political message is built primarily around people-centred governance. He presents himself as an advocate for ordinary citizens and repeatedly emphasises listening, responsiveness and practical solutions. This message has considerable emotional appeal, particularly in an environment where many voters believe political promises are rarely matched by government performance.
However, a successful governorship campaign cannot rely entirely on personality and rhetoric. Hamzat will need a detailed manifesto capable of answering basic questions about education, healthcare, employment, infrastructure, security, agriculture, taxation, local government development and the state’s finances.
His media background gives him an advantage in communicating such policies, but it also creates a higher expectation that he should be able to explain complex issues in language ordinary citizens understand. His pledge to address the stalled Ibadan circular road project, alongside his emphasis on jobs, education and healthcare, provides the beginning of a policy narrative. That narrative will need to be expanded into a coherent development plan.
The APC is likely to present itself around national alignment, party strength and a promise of change. Alli’s campaign can argue that an APC government in Oyo would be better positioned to attract federal support and infrastructure.
Adekanmbi, backed by Makinde, will likely make continuity his strongest argument. The “Omituntun 3.0” narrative is designed to tell voters that the policies and projects of the current administration should continue under a trusted successor. Hamzat therefore needs to offer something more compelling than simply saying “change”. He must explain what exactly he intends to change, how he intends to change it and why voters should trust him to deliver.
Meanwhile, the possible electoral outcomes demonstrate how difficult Hamzat’s task is. In a favourable scenario, Hamzat could attract approximately 40 to 45 per cent of the vote by combining strong support in Ibadan with significant gains in other parts of the state. Under such circumstances, Adekanmbi could fall into the mid-30 per cent range while the APC retains a significant but smaller bloc.
A middle scenario would see Adekanmbi retaining the advantage, with Hamzat emerging as a strong second-place candidate and APC maintaining a substantial base. A difficult scenario for Hamzat would see him confined largely to his Ibadan base, with Adekanmbi benefiting from Makinde’s statewide structure and APC retaining its traditional support areas.
These figures should not be treated as predictions. They are illustrative scenarios designed to show the electoral mathematics involved. The fundamental lesson is that Hamzat cannot win Oyo simply by dominating Ibadan. He must penetrate other regions and build a statewide coalition.
With 33 local government areas, victory requires geographical breadth as well as raw vote numbers. A candidate who performs overwhelmingly in one zone but remains weak elsewhere may find it difficult to cross the constitutional threshold required for victory. The election could also become more complicated if the three leading candidates divide the electorate substantially. A fragmented vote could make regional strength and second-choice preferences extremely important.
The most obvious risk is the absence of incumbency. Hamzat is challenging a political establishment with access to people, structures and networks that have been developed over several years. His second major challenge is the weakness of Accord’s established structure in Oyo. The party’s growing popularity does not automatically mean it has enough experienced personnel to cover every polling unit effectively. The internal disputes surrounding the party’s governorship ticket are another concern. Prolonged litigation could create uncertainty among supporters and potentially weaken the party’s public image.
Zoning could also work against Hamzat. If regional groups decide that it is time for power to move away from Ibadan, his origin could become a significant disadvantage. There is also the risk of political overreliance on his media popularity. A large radio audience is valuable, but listening to a programme is not the same as voting for a candidate. Hamzat must prove that the people who support his media interventions are willing to invest their political loyalty in his governorship campaign.
Finally, a three-way contest can create unpredictable vote-splitting. If the APC consolidates its base while Makinde successfully transfers his support to Adekanmbi, Hamzat could find himself squeezed between two established machines.
Despite these challenges, Hamzat has a number of significant opportunities. The first is voter dissatisfaction. Across Nigeria, there is evidence that voters are increasingly willing to consider alternatives when traditional parties fail to meet expectations. Adeleke’s victory in Osun demonstrates that the dominance of major parties is not absolute.
The second is Hamzat’s personal brand. Unlike many politicians who need to spend enormous resources introducing themselves to voters, Hamzat already has years of public visibility. His audience knows his voice, his style of communication and many of the issues he has championed.
The third is Accord’s new momentum in the South-West. The Osun victory gives the party a compelling political story. Hamzat can tell Oyo voters that Accord is no longer merely a fringe alternative but a platform capable of producing a governor. The fourth is the possibility of political defections. If prominent figures from the APC, PDP, APM or other political groups become dissatisfied with their parties, Hamzat could benefit. However, such defections would matter most if they bring genuine grassroots structures rather than simply prominent names.
The fifth opportunity is the youth vote. Hamzat’s communication style and media background could help him connect with younger voters who may be less attached to traditional party loyalties. If properly organised, that demographic could become a major component of his coalition.
Can Hamzat Actually Repeat Adeleke’s Feat? The answer is that it is possible, but it would require far more than popularity and the Accord name. Adeleke’s Osun victory provides Hamzat with a political template, not a guarantee. The template is clear: build a strong personal brand, mobilise beyond traditional party structures, create a compelling alternative narrative, exploit divisions among established parties and convert grassroots popularity into an organised electoral machine.
Hamzat already possesses some of these ingredients. He has name recognition. He has a substantial media platform. He has a grassroots reputation. He has the “Oyo Npe O” movement. He has the Accord platform. He also enters the race at a time when the success of Accord in Osun has given the party new visibility.
What he does not yet possess at the required scale is a proven statewide political machine. That is the decisive difference. For Hamzat to reproduce Adeleke’s feat, his campaign must move beyond Ibadan. He must become acceptable to voters in Oke-Ogun, Ogbomoso, Oyo, Ibarapa and other parts of the state. He must address zoning concerns, build relationships with influential community leaders and demonstrate that his administration would be genuinely inclusive.
He must also produce a serious manifesto. Voters may be attracted to his story, but governorship elections are ultimately about who they believe can manage the state Most importantly, Hamzat must ensure that every supporter at a rally becomes a potential voter at a polling unit. That is where elections are won.
Finally, Oriyomi Hamzat’s ambition to win the Oyo State governorship election under the Accord platform is undoubtedly an uphill task. He faces a Makinde-backed political structure, an APC machine with national backing and the limitations of a relatively young party organisation. Yet dismissing his candidacy would be equally premature.
The 2026 Osun election has shown that Nigerian politics can still produce unexpected outcomes when a candidate combines personal popularity with effective organisation and a strong political narrative. Adeleke’s victory has given Hamzat something that Accord previously lacked: proof that the party can win a major South-West governorship election.
However, Osun should not be mistaken for Oyo. Adeleke entered his election as an incumbent with an established political base. Hamzat is attempting to create his own political structure while challenging two powerful political blocs. His path is therefore narrower and considerably more demanding.
If Hamzat remains largely an Ibadan candidate, his chances of victory will be limited. If, however, he succeeds in transforming his media popularity into a genuine statewide movement, settles Accord’s internal disputes, builds a strong polling-unit structure, attracts credible political figures from across the state and presents a detailed policy alternative, the 2027 election could become much more competitive than the traditional political arithmetic suggests.
The real question, therefore, is not whether Oriyomi Hamzat can become Oyo’s version of Ademola Adeleke. The question is whether he can build the political coalition that made Adeleke’s victory possible. If he can, the 2027 Oyo governorship election may produce one of the South-West’s most significant political upsets. If he cannot, the strength of incumbency, established party structures and traditional political alliances may prove too formidable for the Accord challenge.
For now, Hamzat remains an outsider with a realistic path to contention but turning that path into victory will require organisation, coalition-building, regional inclusiveness, resources and a campaign operation capable of converting his considerable popularity into actual votes across all 33 local government areas.

